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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF IJTAI I 
Plaintili, 
vs. 
DOROTHY NANNETTE BOSS, 
int. 
CaseTsw, .. . . w + - t . H ' A 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
'lhis rnurl hi11 jurisdiction puriimiil In I If.ili ( nit \ i i i i , il,i/K Ja-3(J)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1 
Issu 10 1: Was there sufficient evidence to support the del
 0 „ 0 lomicide 
convict p 
*h Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5) requires an appellant to set forth "...the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority and citation to the record showing 
that the issue was preserved in the trial court." Due to the fact the defendant's brief does 
not state the standard of review, the State of Utah is attempting to ascertain whether the 
appellant is claiming 'plain error' due to the trial court denying defendant's motions, or 
'insufficiency of evidence'. Based on the issues raised by the defendant on appeal, iL_ 
State of Utah assumes the defendant is claiming insufficiency of evidence.5 
2
 Although the appellant identiho J ^jpmuit, issues m uu 
appellee submits that issues 1 and 3 actually identify ^ 
did the defendant act with criminal negligence with n 
surrounding her conduct or the result of her conduct ^ . M a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist oi uic result will oc^ur. 
Seey 11,C A. 76-2-103(4). 
1 
Issue II: Was the defendant's conduct the proximate cause of the accident? 
" 'When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the 
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made.' " State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252, 1255 (2000 UT App) (quoting Spanish Fork City 
v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501 (1999 UT App) (citations omitted). "However, 'before we can 
uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each 
element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusions of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. (citations omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff does not dispute the defendant's statement of the case.3 
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS 
The defendant, Dorothy Boss, was driving on a two-lane road when she attempted 
to pass at least two cars traveling in the same direction. In front of the two cars Boss 
attempted to pass was a dump truck. As Boss was passing the two cars, she realized that 
another vehicle was quickly approaching in the same lane from the opposite direction. 
Boss attempted to squeeze her vehicle between the dump truck and the car immediately 
behind the dump truck by aggressively swerving back into her original lane of travel. As 
3
 The defendant was also convicted of driving a motor vehicle while her 
driving privilege was denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked, a class C 
misdemeanor, pursuant to U.C.A. 53-3-227. The defendant is not appealing this 
portion of her conviction. 
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Boss swerved back into her lane of travel, her vehicle left the paved roadway and into the 
barrow pit. While in the barrow pit, Boss turned her vehicle to the left in an attempt to 
return to the paved roadway and struck some type of ramp-possibly the edge of a 
driveway. When Boss made contact with the ramp, her vehicle turned on its side and slid 
across the paved roadway into oncoming traffic and struck a vehicle driven by Roy 
Hathaway. Four year-old Jaycee Hathaway was buckled into a car seat behind her father 
and suffered severe head trauma as Boss' vehicle impacted the Hathaway's car. Jaycee 
Hathaway was transported via helicopter to Primary Children's Hospital but died the 
same day. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 17, 2003, Dorothy Boss was driving westbound on highway 73 near 
Saratoga Springs, Utah in a Nissan Altima (R. 17:8-12). Wendall Roy Hathaway, his wife 
Carrie, and two children were driving eastbound on highway 73 in a Ford Crown Victoria 
(R. 66: 3-14). Roy was driving the vehicle, Carrie was in the front passenger seat and 
both children were in the back seat of the vehicle (R. 65: 22-25). Both children were 
buckled up in car seats (R. 20:12-17). It was approximately 3:55 p.m. and both the road 
conditions and weather were good (R. 66:15-21). As the Hathaways were heading 
eastbound, Roy and Carrie noticed Boss' vehicle traveling westbound in the eastbound 
lane (R. 67: 3-6). At the time Roy and Carrie saw Boss in their own lane of travel, 
Dorothy Boss was passing two or more vehicles (R. 67:16-19). Upon seeing Boss' 
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vehicle approaching in the same lane, Roy began to slow down and pull off to the side of 
the road (R. 67: 23-24). Roy estimates he was traveling approximately 65 mph (R. 68:1). 
Dorothy Boss estimates she was traveling approximately 70 mph (R. 26: 12-13). The 
posted speed limit was 65 mph (R. 27: 4-7, State's Exhibit No. 25). As the Hathaways 
continued to watch Dorothy Boss approach in the same lane, Boss turns sharply and cuts 
back into the westbound lane directly behind a dump truck. (R 68: 6-8; 82:18-24; 83: 3-
11). After briefly disappearing behind the dump truck, Boss9 vehicle returned back into 
the eastbound lane sliding sideways on the driver's side door and struck the Hathaway's 
vehicle (R. 68: 13-16; 101: 16-18). At the time Boss9 vehicle struck the Hathaway's 
vehicle, the Boss vehicle was on its side and after impact, the Boss vehicle dropped back 
down on its wheels (R. 101: 22-25). In addition, at the point of impact, the Hathaway 
vehicle had moved almost completely off the roadway and was only a few feet inside the 
eastbound lane (R. 112: 4-9). Four year-old Jaycee Hathaway was sitting in the back seat 
on the driver's side when the impact occurred and suffered severe head trauma from the 
impact (R. 19: 7-14). Jaycee Hathaway died on the same day due to injuries sustained 
from the accident (R. 75: 10-24). 
Deputy Ray Edwards, employed with the Utah County Sheriff's Office, responded 
to the scene of the accident and took measurements and photographs and input the 
information into a computer program to help reconstruct the accident (R. 44: 22-24; 
45:1). Deputy Edwards testified that because identification cones placed at the scene of 
4 
the accident had been moved by the medical responders, he was not able to adequately 
prepare an accident reconstruction drawing (R. 46:13-25; 47: 1-4). Deputy Edwards 
initially identified a point of impact but admitted that his estimate was incorrect (R. 51: 
18-21). Deputy Edwards was not aware the Boss vehicle had turned on its side prior to 
striking the Hathaways and, therefore, Deputy Edwards did not attempt to look for a 
lifting mechanism at the scene of the accident (R. 52: 1-7; 56: 9-15). Deputy Edwards 
speculated that a possible lifting mechanism may have been a new driveway that was 
recently installed on the north side of the road (R. 53: 15-21). However, within 3 days of 
the accident, portions of the road were torn up and reconstructed near the point of the 
accident (R. 125:7-9). 
Greg Duvall was hired by the State of Utah to reconstruct the accident. The court, 
without objection by the defendant, recognized Duvall as an expert witness to testify 
about accident reconstruction (R. 97: 3-7). Duvall stated he began the accident 
reconstruction process by reviewing the police reports, accident scene photographs, 
engineering survey data and data regarding the vehicles involved in the accident (R. 97: 
16-24; 99: 7-11). After receiving all of the data, Duvall input this information into a 
computer program and developed a drawing indicating, among other things, the edge of 
the pavement, the lane edges, the center lines, gouge marks and where the vehicles came 
to rest (R. 99: 13-23). Duvall testified he worked backwards from the point where the 
vehicles came to rest and utilizing all of the data, he attempted to demonstrate how the 
5 
accident occurred (R. 100: 7-9). Duvall testified the Boss vehicle was on its left side, the 
driver's side, as it came sliding across the highway and made contact with the Hathaways 
(R. 101:16-18). 
Duvall testified there were no indications suggesting that when Boss swerved her 
vehicle from the eastbound lane back into the westbound lane, that her car began to slide 
sideways (R. 103: 18-25). Therefore, in order for Boss' vehicle to turn onto the driver's 
side, the vehicle would need to leave the paved roadway and hit a ramp or some other 
mechanism causing the vehicle to turn on its side (R. 104: 17-21). There was no evidence 
Boss' vehicle made contact with any item on the paved road causing the vehicle to turn 
on its side (R. 104: 14-16). Duvall stated that when Boss left the paved roadway, she 
possibly made contact with a driveway which acted like a ramp, and combined with Boss 
turning the steering wheel to the left as she made contact with the ramp, her vehicle 
turned on its side and proceeded into the eastbound lane (R. 106: 23-25; 107: 1-10). In 
order for Boss to make contact with the driveway, Boss' vehicle left the paved roadway 
(R. 107: 19-21). Duvall testified that in order for Boss' vehicle to travel from the 
eastbound lane, onto the westbound shoulder and strike the driveway, Boss would need to 
employ hard, aggressive steering. Boss' steering was beyond what is normally required to 
return back into her lane of travel (R. 109: 5-13). Duvall was unable to determine the 
speed of Boss's vehicle at the point of impact (R. 109: 16-18). There was no evidence 
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suggesting Boss struck the dump truck as she attempted to pull behind the dump truck 
and in front of the cars she was passing (R. 110: 9-13). 
Duvall testified that in his opinion, Roy Hathaway was not negligent because he 
moved to the right of the roadway as he recognized Boss approaching in his lane of 
travel, and that his foot was apparently covering the brake pedal because he initiated 
braking and started to skid just before the collision (R. 112: 14-23). Although Duvall was 
unable to calculate the speed of Boss' vehicle, speed did play a role in Boss leaving the 
paved roadway (R. 112: 22-25; 113: 1-10). If Boss would have kept her vehicle on the 
roadway, there is nothing to suggest her vehicle would have turned on its side (R. 113: 
11-16). Duvall stated that in his opinion Boss was negligent by steering her vehicle in 
such an aggressive manner which caused her to leave the roadway and onto the gravel 
shoulder and resulted in her vehicle turning on its side (R. 113: 17-25; 114: 1-6). 
Mr. Dennis Andrews was hired by Intermountain Claims to investigate the 
accident on behalf of an insurance company and was recognized as an expert witness in 
accident reconstruction (R. 132:1-3, 9-10). Mr. Andrews testified he was unable to 
identify the event which caused defendant's vehicle to roll on its side (R. 136: 1-2). 
However, Mr. Andrews testified that in his opinion, Dorothy Boss acted negligently and 
he explained his reasons for his opinion (R. 137). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: In order for a person to be found criminally negligent, the person does 
not need to be aware but ought to be aware of a substantial risk and that the result will 
occur. In other words, Dorothy Boss did not need to know that a lifting mechanism 
actually existed in the barrow pit which could cause her vehicle to turn on its side. 
Dorothy Boss can be criminally negligent if a reasonable person ought to know that by 
aggressively swerving a car on a roadway while traveling 70 mph would cause the car to 
leave the road. In addition, when a vehicle leaves the road traveling 70 mph, a reasonable 
person ought to know that the vehicle may come in contact with some object causing the 
vehicle to either flip over or roll onto its side. 
Point II: Dorothy Boss' actions can be the proximate cause of th traffic accident 
even if she did not know that some object in the barrow pit would act as a lifting 
mechanism causing her vehicle to turn on its side. A person's actions can be the 
i 
proximate cause of an injury so long as the later event can be reasonably expected as a 
result of the natural sequence of events initiated by that person. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN AWARE THAT PASSING 
SEVERAL VEHICLES AT THE SAME TIME ON A TWO-LANE ROAD 
AND SWERVING HER VEHICLE AT 70 MPH CREATED AN 
UNJUSTIFIABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL RISK. 
Defendant cites to the case of State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252, (UT App 1989) to 
support her contention that her conduct does not rise to the level of criminal negligence. 
8 . 
In Larsen, the defendant was driving a Ford Ranger, approached an intersection, pulled 
into the left-hand turn lane and prepared to make a left turn. The light turned red and the 
defendant waited in the turn lane until the light changed to green. After the light changed 
to green, the defendant briefly waited and then began his left turn. A Subaru Legacy, 
approaching the same intersection from the other direction, entered the intersection at the 
same time as the defendant began making his left turn and collided with the defendant's 
vehicle. An individual in the Subaru was killed and the defendant was charged with 
negligent homicide. 
At trial, the court received evidence indicating the weather was dry and although it 
was dusk, it was still light outside. The court also found that, "Neither driver slowed 
down or swerved to avoid the accident." Id. at 1254. At the conclusion of the trial, 
defendant was found guilty of negligent homicide and failure to yield the right-of-way. 
On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction for negligent homicide. The defendant asserted "...that the trial court erred in 
its legal conclusions by failing to concede that defendant's driving could be outside the 
ordinary standard of care, or simply negligent, without rising to the level of criminal 
negligence."/*/, at 1256. 
In reviewing the defendant's claims on appeal, the court stated that, "Conduct is 
not criminally negligent unless is constitutes a 'gross deviation from the standard of care 
exercised by an ordinary person.'" Larsen at 1257, (quoting State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 
9 
254, 267 (Utah 1988)). The court in Larsen also referred to State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 
1204, 1207 (UT App 1989) explaining that '"[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment 
resulting even in death of another in not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it 
so.'" Larsen at 1257. Finally, as part of its analysis, the court looked at State v. Hallet, 
619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980), claiming that '"The 'negligence' required in this context 
must be more than the lack of ordinary care and precaution; it must be something more 
than mere inadvertence or misadventure, but rather a recklessness or indifference 
incompatible with a proper regard for human life.'" Larsen at 1257. 
In looking at all of the factors presented at trial, the appellate court in Larsen 
determined there was no nexus between the collision and the small amount of alcohol in 
the defendant's system, unlit headlights, and the defendant's failure to activate his turn 
signal. The court held that "[t]he facts presented at trial do not indicate that defendant's 
actions were undertaken recklessly or with an indifference to human life, nor does the 
quality of defendant's act lead to the conclusion that his actions were criminal. Rather, 
defendant simply failed to see an oncoming car which was visible to other drivers as he 
made a left turn, with tragic consequences." Id. The Utah Court appeals reversed Larsen's 
conviction of negligent homicide. Contrasting the Larsen case with the case at hand, the 
plaintiff submits that Dorothy Boss' actions went beyond simply failing to see an 
oncoming car. 
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In the present case, Dorothy Boss was in a hurry to pick up her children from 
grade school. Grade school ended at 3:30 p.m., the accident occurred at 3:55 p.m. and the 
defendant was still 5 to 6 miles from the school (R. 26: 4-10). Due to the defendant being 
late to pick up her children, she was attempting to pass at least two cars at the same time 
on a two-lane road. Before Boss began her passing maneuver, it is presumed she looked 
into the oncoming lane of traffic and made a conscious decision that she could complete 
the pass and safely return to her own lane of travel before making contact with the 
oncoming vehicle. However, it is also presumed that Boss was able to see the dump truck 
traveling ahead of the two cars and in undertaking the passing maneuver, she either 
intended to pass the two cars and the dump truck or at some point she determined that she 
would not be able to pass the dump truck and attempted to squeeze her vehicle behind the 
dump truck.4 These facts, along with the defendant's admission that she was speeding, 
distinguishes the Larsen case from the case at hand. 
The defendant in Larsen simply failed to see an oncoming car and turns his vehicle 
into the approaching Subaru. However, the defendant in the case at hand takes a 
calculated risk that she is able to make it past several vehicles and safely return to her 
own lane. When the defendant realizes the Hathaway vehicle was quickly approaching, 
instead of safely merging back into her own lane of travel, the defendant turns so 
aggressively that her vehicle shoots back across the paved roadway and into the barrow 
4
 Although Dorothy Boss testified at trial, she claimed that she had no independent 
memory of the accident (R. 144: 22-24). 
11 
pit. The totality of defendant's actions rise to the level of indifference and fail to show a 
proper regard for human life. Both accident reconstructionists testified that in their 
opinions, the defendant's passing maneuver, her speed and steering were beyond that of a 
what is expected by a normal person and were considered negligent (R. 109; 112- 114; 
136-137). 
The plaintiff seeks to clarify one aspect of the decision set forth in Lars en. The 
court in Larsen stated, "The facts presented at trial do not indicate the defendant's 
actions were undertaken recklessly or with an indifference to human life,..." Larsen at 
1257. (Emphasis added). Utah Code Annotated §76-2-103 defines the separate culpable 
mental states which are required for different crimes. The crime of manslaughter requires 
a mens rea of recklessness and a person acts recklessly when he "... is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk..." Utah Code Ann. §76-2-
103(3). "In contrast, the mens rea for criminal negligence constituting negligent homicide 
is that defendant was unaware of but ought to have been aware of a substantial risk the 
result would occur." State v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523, 525 (UT App 1989). Therefore, 
the analysis to determine whether a person acts with recklessness or with criminal 
negligence is different. The courts have declared that "...the distinction between the mens 
rea for each crime is one of intent, [State v. Howard, 597 P.2d at 881], the court in Dyer 
further clarified that the distinction involves the degree of perception of risk." Wessendorf 
at 525 (citing to State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983)). Therefore, the court in 
12 
Larsen should not have used the term 'reckless5 when determining whether the defendant 
was guilty of negligent homicide. 
In addition to the eye witness testimony and the expert opinions regarding 
reconstruction of the accident, the jury in the case at hand was given the following 
instruction: "A vehicle may not be operated on the left side of the center of the roadway 
in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless the left 
side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance to permit 
overtaking and passing to be completed without interfering with the operation of any 
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction of any vehicle overtaken" (R: 176: 7-14). 
As the jury considered all of the evidence, listened to the jury instructions defining 
criminal negligence and was instructed on the law regarding when a vehicle may pass 
another vehicle, the plaintiff submits there was sufficient evidence demonstrating 
Dorothy Boss ought to have been aware that her actions created a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk and that her failure to perceive the risk was a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise as viewed from Boss' standpoint. 
IL THE DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE WAS THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY EVEN IF THERE WAS ALSO 
ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. 
The defendant also seeks to overturn her conviction claiming the State failed to 
demonstrate the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the accident. In fact, 
13 
defendant claims the "evidence here was based on speculation and conjecture relating to 
the cause of the accident." Appellant's Brief, p. 18. The crux of defendant's argument 
regarding proximate cause is as follows: Since the State is unable to adequately identify 
the lifting mechanism which caused defendant's car to turn on its side, the "independent 
and unknown force" is the cause of the accident and not a result of defendant's conduct. 
M a t p. 19. 
In the case of State v. Hallet, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980), the defendant was 
charged with negligent homicide after he bent over a stop sign at an intersection and a 
driver approaching the intersection failed to see the bent over stop sign and collided with 
another vehicle killing one of the occupants. The defendant was convicted of negligent 
homicide and the trial court "expressly found that the defendant should have foreseen that 
his removal of the stop sign created a substantial risk of injury or death to others; and that 
doing so constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the circumstances." Hallet at 338. On appeal, the defendant claimed 
he was not the proximate cause of the death claiming "there was evidence that as the 
deceased approached from the south, she was exceeding the speed limit of 25 mph; and 
that this was the subsequent intervening and proximate cause of her own death." Id. The 
court dismissed the defendant's claim on several fronts that the deceased's speed was a 
subsequent intervening and proximate cause of her own death and one of the court's 
explanations provides appropriate insight into the issue of proximate cause. The court 
14 
declared, "It is also held that where a party by his wrongful conduct creates a condition of 
peril, his action can properly be found to be the proximate cause of a resulting injury, 
even though later events which combined to cause the injury may also be classified as 
negligent, so long as the latter act is something which can reasonably be expected to 
follow in the natural sequence of events." Id. at 339. In other words, even a subsequent 
intervening negligent act will not abrogate a person's culpability so long as that person 
created the initial perilous condition. In applying this holding to the present case, not even 
the defendant claims that the lifting mechanism was a negligent act but rather, the lifting 
mechanism was some inanimate object that may have been a driveway or a mound of dirt. 
Therefore, if a subsequent negligent act by a third party does not relieve a person from 
being the proximate cause of an injury, so long as that person creates the peril, how can 
an unidentifiable lump in the barrow pit shield the defendant from responsibility? The 
evidence presented at trial supports the State's position that the defendant created the 
perilous condition due to her own choices, and the consequences of her choices caused 
her vehicle to leave the roadway, encounter some item in the barrow pit and causing her 
vehicle to turn on its side. 
The defendant cites to the Arkansas Supreme Court case of Ayers v. State, 444 
S.W. 2d 695 (1969) to support her claim that speculation and conjecture as to the cause of 
an accident cannot support a conviction. In Ayers, two vehicles collided on a two-lane 
road and no one was able to testify about witnessing the accident. Id. at 697. There was 
15 
no evidence presented as to which direction the vehicles were traveling and "[t]he only 
evidence that either vehicle was being driven in a reckless or wanton disregard of the 
safety of others, at the time of the collision, was the circumstantial evidence consisting of 
debris and marks on the pavement, tending to prove that the two automobiles came 
together with the point of impact being about two feet north of the center line, in the west 
bound traffic lane of the highway." Id.5 The court held that, "[t]he criminal negligence in 
this case falls most heavily on the driver who crossed the center line of the highway, and 
the evidence in the record before us would require surmise and conjecture for a 
determination of which driver crossed the center line." Id at 700. Therefore, the appellate 
court in Ayers refused to uphold the trial court's conviction of negligent homicide 
because there was insufficient evidence demonstrating which driver crossed over the line. 
In the present case, there is no speculation or doubt that Dorothy Boss swerved from the 
passing lane into her original lane of travel, left the roadway causing her vehicle to turn 
on its side and collide with the Hathaways. The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to 
uphold Ayers' conviction because it could not determine which driver created the perilous 
condition of crossing over the center line. However, it is obvious and without dispute in 
the present case as to which driver created the perilous condition which resulted in the 
death of another individual. Therefore, the Ayers case is readily distinguishable from the 
case at hand. 
5
 It is of interest to note that both driver's had a blood alcohol level of 0.15 and both were 
deemed to be driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Ayers at 697. 
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The defendant also cites to the case of State of Washington v. McAllister, 806 P.2d 
772 (1991) to bolster her position that an intervening act by a third person broke the 
causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury of another 
individual.6 In McAllister, the defendant was driving a 1966 Volkswagen van while 
intoxicated. Riding in the back of the van was the defendant's 27 year-old daughter who 
was also intoxicated. As the defendant was driving, he remembered leaving his jacket at 
the tavern and turned the vehicle around and headed back towards the tavern. At some 
point while turning the van around, the defendant's daughter fell out of the van's sliding 
door and died as a result of her injuries. The defendant testified at trial that he was 
traveling between 10 to 15 mph while turning the van around, which testimony was 
corroborated other eyewitnesses. Id at 775. There was also evidence presented that the 
sliding door to the van was old and may have been improperly secured earlier in the day 
by the defendant's wife. Id. "The State's only evidence that Mr. McAllister was negligent 
was a tire mark which purportedly came from the Volkswagen van and the reconstruction 
testimony of an officer admitted he was not an expert in the field of accident 
reconstruction and who did not witness the accident. We find such evidence insufficient 
to demonstrate negligence." Id. 
In supporting its reversal of the trial court's conviction, the court in McAllister 
declared that, "[w]hen the independent intervening act of a third person was one which 
6
 The case of State v. McAllister has been abrogated by State v. Roggenkamp, 106 P.3d 
196 (2005), however, the State still chooses to respond to the defendant's argument 
relating to proximate cause. 
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was not incumbent upon the defendant to have anticipated as reasonably likely to happen, 
then there is a break in the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the 
plaintiffs injury." Id. (Emphasis added). Once again, as in the above-cited case of State v. 
Hallet, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980), the appellate court looked to whether a superceding act 
caused by a third party contributed to the injury and broke the causal connection 
stemming from the defendant's own negligence. The State reiterates that in the present 
case, there was not an intervening nor superceding act by a third party which broke the 
causal connection initiated by the defendant's own negligence. Therefore, the State 
submits that the factors identified in the case of State v. McAllister are distinguishable 
from the present case and should not be relied upon-even as non-binding authority. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully submits there was sufficient 
evidence presented at trial and requests the Court to affirm the defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this Jo day of April 2005. 
TIMOTHY L. TAYLOR 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
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